The need to kill off zombie law: indecent assault, where it went wrong and how to put it right by Sjölin, C
 1 
The need to kill off zombie law: indecent assault, where it went wrong and 
how to put it right 
 
Catarina Sjölin (Senior Lecturer at Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent 
University and Barrister) 
 
Summary 
 
The law on indecent assault is currently misunderstood leading to substantial 
injustice for some abused as children. The first half of the article explores the 
nature and causes of these misunderstandings, discussing particularly the 
true nature of touching for indecent and common assaults. In the second half 
the article argues that despite a correction of the law being necessarily 
retroactive in effect it is not just permissible but necessary to make that 
correction. 
 
Article 
 
In 1950 an adult man told a nine year old girl to touch his penis. She 
complied. Upon these facts, in the case of Fairclough v Whipp1, Lord Goddard 
CJ in the Divisional Court held that although this was ‘disgusting’, it was not 
an indecent assault and the man’s conviction for that offence was quashed. 
The principles from the decision – that (1) instructing V to touch D’s genitals 
                                                 
1 Fairclough v Whipp (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 138 DC. 
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is not an indecent assault, and (2) neither is it an indecent assault if V 
complies – are still applied, most recently in 2015 by the Court of Appeal in 
Dunn2. This article argues that the decision in Fairclough, together with three 
other decisions in the 1950s involving commands by adults to children to 
touch the adults’ genitals (Beal v Kelley3, Burrows4, DPP v Rogers5), were 
wrongly decided in relation to (1) the meaning of touching, (2) the 
requirement of ‘hostility’ as an element of assault, (3) the role of consent in 
indecent assaults of children and (4) the role of unlawfulness in assault. When 
these errors are understood the Fairclough line is left unsupported and 
conduct in the paradigm situation– where adult D commands child V to make 
contact with his/her genitals and also where V does as instructed – is 
properly classified as an indecent assault (by assault or battery respectively).  
 
This wrong turn in the law of indecent assault is not a matter of purely 
historical interest but a continuing problem for the courts. Although all 
conduct which could be charged as indecent assault must have occurred prior 
midnight on 30th April 2004,6 allegations concerning historical sexual abuse 
are being made in ever increasing numbers.7 There is no reason to think that 
                                                 
2 Dunn [2015] EWCA Crim 724 CA 
3 Beal v Kelley (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 128 DC. 
4 Burrows (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 180 CCA. 
5 DPP v Rogers (1953) 37 Cr. App. R. 137 DC. 
6 When ss. 14 and 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, sch 7 (Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Commencement) Order 2004, SI 2004/874, art 2). 
7 Reporting rates for historical and current offending have been increasing since 2012, with 
the increase in reporting becoming more pronounced in 2015. Office for National Statistics, 
“Crime in England and Wales, Year ending September” (Office for National Statistics, 2015) 
Office for National Statistics online,  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandand
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this trend will change in the immediate future8; those who suffered from 
sexual offending as children may take many years to come forward, 
particularly in familial cases where the desire to avoid family breakup or 
upset may lead people not to complain until some family members have died. 
The paradigm situation has been partially covered, since 1st January 1961, by 
the Indecency with Children Act 1960 (IWCA) s.1 offence of committing an 
act of gross indecency with or towards a child. This article will explain why 
the IWCA is really no answer to the error at the heart of the Fairclough line 
and argue that the Court of Appeal must confront and correct the mistakes in 
the Fairclough line and accept that conduct in the paradigm situation 
constitutes indecent assault. Finally, the article contends that despite the 
retrospective nature of such a decision, it is the only proper decision which 
the appellate courts can take in this situation. 
 
Indecent assault  
                                                                                                                                            
wales/yearendingseptember2015#sexual-offences [Accessed 12 April 2016] pp.49-50; Office for 
National Statistics, “Crime Statistics, Focus on Violent Crime and Sexual Offences, 2013/14” 
(Office for National Statistics, 2015) Chapter 1, Office for National Statistics online, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-crime-and-sexual-offences-
-2013-14/rpt-chapter-1.html?format=print [Accessed 7 January 2016], Section 9. The term 
‘historical’ is used to describe conduct which occurred one year or more before the date of 
report to the police, so some of the ‘historical’ offending will be under the SOA 2003, but 
there will still be a number of allegations which predate the SOA 2003. 
8 The Office for National Statistics suggests that the ever increasing number of reports of 
sexual offences is due to both better police procedures and the recent reports, investigations 
and inquiries. Although Operations Yewtree and Midland may have come to an end, the 
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse is likely to continue for a number of years and 
cover the whole country, with six regional offices (Office for National Statistics, “Crime in 
England and Wales, Year ending September” (Office for National Statistics, 2015) Office for 
National Statistics online,  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandand
wales/yearendingseptember2015#sexual-offences [Accessed 12 April 2016] p.50). 
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It is common ground that indecent assault is common assault (assault or 
battery) aggravated by the element of indecency.9 The paradigm situation is 
unarguably indecent (as was accepted in Fairclough). The errors appear when 
the cases consider the nature of assault in this context and it is important to 
understand first how and why the Fairclough cases were decided as they were.  
The four cases were decided between 1951 and 195310 and the very brief 
judgments were all given by Lord Goddard CJ.  
 
In Beal, the first of the cases, a fourteen year old boy (V) alone in a wood with 
D (an adult male) was asked by D to hold and rub D’s exposed penis. V 
refused and turned away whereupon D caught hold of him and pulled him 
back. Lord Goddard characterised the situation thus: “[t]here, at any rate, was 
the assault, a hostile act, because the act was against the boy’s will.” Thus, 
because, and only because, of the grab to V, this was an indecent assault (by 
battery).11 Had V simply complied or had D not grabbed him in a “hostile” 
manner, there would have been no indecent assault, as was Lord Goddard’s  
conclusion in Fairclough itself, decided just weeks later. In Fairclough Lord 
Goddard made clear that in his view assault involved typically “a threatening 
                                                 
9 See Beal v Kelley (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 128 DC, quoting with approval from Archbold (32nd ed) 
1067, DPP v Rogers (1953) 37 Cr. App. R. 137 DC and Lord Griffiths in Court [1988] 1 A.C. 28 
HL, 33. 
10 The cases concern the earlier version of indecent assault found in the Offences against the 
Person Act 1861 ss.52 and 62 to which consent could not be pleaded where V was aged under 
16 (Criminal Law Amendment Act 1922 s.1). The joint effect of these provisions is the same as 
the offences of indecent assault against males and females under SOA 1965 ss.14 and 15 
respectively. 
11 Although in DPP v Rogers he states that Beal involved an assault rather than a battery, this 
must be an error as it was his view that D taking V’s arm and pulling V towards him 
constituted the offence. 
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gesture or a threat to use violence made against a person” and concluded that 
“I cannot hold that an invitation to touch the invitor can amount to an assault 
on the invitee… [i]t seems to me that there must be an act done to a person”.12 
This belief that there must be an act and it must be “done” to V permeates all 
four of the decisions. 
 
Although there is no mention in Fairclough of a need for hostility, the need for 
it is implicit in that decision, following so quickly after Lord Goddard 
required hostility in Beal. Lord Goddard himself referred to Fairclough  two 
months later in Burrows (on very similar facts to Fairclough) as authority for 
the requirement of hostility13 when he stated firmly that in the absence of a 
threat or “a hostile act against” the child, there was no indecent assault.14 In 
the final case of Rogers, V’s father led her upstairs and commanded her to 
masturbate him on two occasions, a command with which she complied, 
although she did not want to. Lord Goddard’s view was that neither occasion 
amounted to an indecent assault because there was no “compulsion” or  
hostility (“a threat or gesture which could be taken as a threat”).  Hostility 
was clearly seen by Lord Goddard as a requirement of assault and conduct 
which might amount to an assault would not do so if it was not hostile. 
 
                                                 
12 At p.140. 
13 In Burrows. Lord Mustill in R v Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 HL, 260 cited Fairclough as the first 
of the line of cases which required hostility for an assault. 
14 At p.182. 
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Although he accepted in Fairclough that an indecent assault cannot be 
defended by reliance on the child’s consent, Lord Goddard considered that 
the assault had to be established first, seemingly making the child’s consent 
relevant when deciding whether a common assault had occurred. In Rogers, 
he found that for indecent assault there needed to be “evidence show[ing] 
that what was being done was really done against the will of the child” noting 
that although V had not wanted to do as her father instructed her “she made 
no objection or resistance and no force was used”. Her submission meant that 
he considered what had happened to be not truly against her will and thus no 
offence. In Beal he had also made the comment that “[i]t does not matter that 
the boy could not give consent; the act was in fact against his will”. Despite 
repeated statutory prohibitions on the legal recognition of consent to indecent 
assault by those aged under 16,15 Lord Goddard gives the child’s consent and 
his/her will legal standing in this line of cases. 
 
Finally, in Rogers Lord Goddard noted that in the absence of evidence that the 
conduct was against the child’s will there was no offence as “[h]ere no force 
was used and nothing was done except what any father may do”.16 This 
approach was picked up in some later cases to prevent what looked like 
indecent assaults from being unlawful. 
                                                 
15 SOA 1956 ss.14(2) and 15(2). Prior to that the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1922 s.1 and 
before that the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1880 s.2 (under 13’s). 
16 At pp.139-140. It should be noted that the report at [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1017 is rather shorter 
and omits the words “Here no force was used and nothing was done except what any father 
may do”. It is not known whether the Criminal Appeal Reports writer made a mistake in 
noting the judgment or whether the court thought better of the words and had them excised 
from the ICLR report. 
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What it means to touch 
 
As “the least touching of another…is battery”, 17 the definition of touching is 
vital to understanding both indecent assault by battery and apprehended 
immediate battery (i.e. assault). Lord Goddard CJ’s view in Fairclough that an 
invitation cannot amount to an assault reflected what he clearly believed was 
the orthodox view, as he noted that “[i]t is unnecessary to go into any old 
learning on what constitutes an assault”. It is submitted, however, that Lord 
Goddard was wrong, as an invitation to V (and particularly a command, 
which is what occurred in Fairclough, and the other three cases, rather than the 
invitation in itself) can amount to an assault upon V. Similarly, a complied-
with instruction to V to touch D can amount to a battery upon V. 
 
If D brings about contact between V and something else, that constitutes a 
battery, even if V is the one who is moving; touching does not have to take the 
definition of “bring[ing] the hand etc into contact with [something]” but can 
and does take the definition of “bring[ing] two things into mutual contact”.18 
This has been accepted not just in hypothetical situations such as D digging a 
pit for V to fall into19 or D breaking the ice in front of V who is skating on a 
                                                 
17 Cole v Turner (1704) 87 Eng Rep 907, 6 Mod 149 and Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 3, 
Chapter 8. 
18 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 8th ed (Oxford: OUP, 1992), p.1289. 
19 Clarence (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 CCR, 36 (Wills J), 45 (Stephen J). Case since overruled on a 
different point.  
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frozen pond20 but more importantly in the cases of Martin21 (D barred the 
doors of a theatre and shouted ‘fire’ leading to V fracturing his skull as V fell 
on the stairs making for the exit), DPP v K22 (foolish school boy K poured acid 
into the upturned vent of a hand drier and when V later switched the drier on 
he was sprayed with the acid) and Santa-Bermudez23 (D said he had “no 
sharps” about his person when asked by PC V before she searched him, but 
PC V then pricked herself on one of the syringes he in fact had in his pocket). 
In all these cases V is the proximate cause of the contact but it is D who is 
culpable in bringing it about.  
 
It might be countered that an act by D is required for an assault and a 
command cannot be an act. However that only makes sense if words cannot 
constitute an assault, and that belief is no longer correct (if it ever was).24 D’s 
culpability is in violating the principle that “every man’s person [is] sacred”25 
(or take the more modern approach that D is violating V’s personal 
autonomy) by bringing about the contact between V and something else 
whether by placing his hand on V, throwing something at V, placing a trap 
                                                 
20 C.S. Kenny and G.G.  Phillips Outlines of Criminal Law 15th edn (Cambridge: CUP, 1947), 
p.176, attributed to J. Stephen Digest of Criminal Law 7th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1926), 
Art. 340, n.3.  
21 Martin (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 554 CCR. Although the court in Martin did not specifically find that 
there was a battery to support the conviction under s.20 Offences against the Person Act 1861, 
that was the implication and accords with the view of Wills J in Clarence (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23 
CCR which considered Martin. 
22 DPP v K (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 23 DC. 
23 Santa-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2908 (Admin); [2004] Crim. L.R. 471. 
24 Ireland; Burstow [1998] A.C. 147 HL. 
25 Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 3, Chapter 8.  
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for V or using words to bring about the contact, without V’s free, informed 
and legally-recognised, consent. 
 
This approach is also supported by some pre-1950s indecent assault decisions. 
Most indecent assault cases of this period give little or no details of the 
contact involved between the parties and none of those before 1900 is of any 
assistance. The first relevant case is Hare26 from 1934 where D (who was 
female) had “instigated and induced” a 12 year old boy to have sexual 
intercourse with her on three occasions. She was convicted of indecent assault 
and appealed on the basis that the offence (then under s.62 of the OAPA) 
could only be committed by a male as it was in that part of the OAPA which 
dealt with “unnatural offences or offences of a sodomitical character”. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal disagreed and upheld the conviction. Bearing in 
mind that sexual intercourse was viewed at this time as something done by a 
male to a female, there was no issue raised about whether the conduct in itself 
could found the offence, despite it being an act done by V to D; there is no 
mention in the report of D doing anything extra to V, the allegation being 
limited to instigating and inducing. This suggests that the meaning of 
touching contended for earlier was used in this case: D was guilty because she 
brought about the mutual contact between herself and V and that contact was 
indecent. Hare was followed in Police v Marchant27 and Boxer,28 the latter 
                                                 
26 Hare [1934] 1 KB 354 CCA. 
27 Police v Marchant (1938) 2 J Crim L 324, Colchester magistrates court. 
28 Boxer (1944) 4 J Crim L 168, Mr W Blake Odgers KC in the North London Police Court, 
decision upheld by the appeal committee of the quarter sessions. 
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involving the paradigm situation as child V complied with D’s instruction to 
touch D’s genitals. There is also support for this understanding of touching in 
one of Lord Goddard’s own judgments: the 1952 case of Rolfe,29 decided in the 
middle of the Fairclough line by the Court of Criminal Appeal. In that case D 
and V (adults, male and female respectively) were alone in a train 
compartment and D exposed his penis and moved towards V “inviting her to 
have connection with him”. The Court found that this did amount to an 
indecent assault, expressly noting that there need not be contact for an 
indecent assault. The only justification for the difference between Rolfe and 
the Fairclough line was D’s motion towards V having exposed himself, making 
this an act rather than simply words. That justification falls away now that 
words can constitute an assault; an invitation to make contact can be enough, 
depending on the circumstances. 
 
There are three further arguments against an understanding of touching for 
indecent and common assault which involves simply bringing V and 
something else into contact. The first argument is based on Innes v Wylie,30 
that D cannot commit a battery by being passive and obstructing V like an 
inanimate object. This use of Innes is not justified. The contended principle is 
derived from the direction given by Lord Denman CJ to a jury in the 
circumstance of a clear factual dispute where, on D’s version, he was not 
                                                 
29 Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 4 CCA. 
30 Innes v Wylie (1844) 1 C. & K. 263; 173 Eng. Rep. 803 QB. See C.S. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal 
Law, 11th edn (Cambridge: CUP, 1917), p.176 and G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 2nd edn 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1983), p179. 
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doing anything to V, but barring his way as V pushed and shoved him.31 That 
would not be a battery on any definition of the offence and, crucially, there 
was no instruction by D to V to touch D. In any event, since the acceptance 
that an assault may be committed by words alone, Innes is a matter of legal 
history. 
 
The second argument is that V’s decision to do as he is told is a break in the 
chain of causation, as with the heroin addict’s decision to take the drug 
supplied to him by D in Kennedy (No. 2).32 This, goes the argument, is also a 
demonstration of V’s consent to the touch and so this cannot be a battery 
because his action is voluntary; it is free, deliberate and informed. But V’s 
actions are not taken to break the chain of causation begun by D in all 
circumstances. Where V’s actions are not informed (as in K and Santana-
Bermudez) they are accepted as having been caused by D. Where they are 
informed, but not free, they similarly do not break the chain of causation, as 
with the fleeing theatregoer in Martin or the terrified woman in Roberts33 
jumping from a moving vehicle to escape D. Where D’s assault or battery has 
led to V doing an act which caused V injuries, D is responsible for V’s injuries 
as long as V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable, his/her actions not being 
free. Although Roberts involved the question of causation of injuries, there is 
no reason why this approach should not be used when it is not the injuries 
                                                 
31 Innes v Wylie was a civil matter and V was in fact the plaintiff, but the terms D and V are 
used here for consistency. 
32 Kennedy [No.2]  [2007] UKHL 38; [2008] 1 A.C.  269. 
33 Roberts (1971) 56 Cr. App. R. 95 CA. 
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but the touch which is caused by V’s actions, as in Martin.34 If D’s instruction 
to V is in a situation in which V is not in a position to resist – as, for instance, 
child V alone with adult D – V’s compliance with D’s command is not a break 
in the chain of causation but simply another link in it. Further, and 
importantly for the paradigm situation, where V is a child and the act is 
indecent V’s consent is irrelevant in any event (see below) and thus cannot be 
a break in the chain of causation. 
 
The third argument is that a battery must involve a direct application of force 
by D upon V. 35 This is an unsatisfactory approach as it sets up a requirement 
of directness which is not, in fact, a requirement at all; this approach does not 
explain cases like K and so requires a separate ragbag category of indirect 
touching to cover the “booby-trap” situations. 36 A preferable approach would 
be to abandon  the categories of indirect/direct application of force and focus 
instead on whether D caused V to come into contact with D (or an object) 
better reflects the case law, and the mischief which the offence of battery has 
                                                 
34 The notion that D’s threats (or deceit) can overcome V’s will appears in modern statutory 
sexual offences in the offence under s.4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of causing sexual 
activity without consent, an example of which can be seen in Bingham [2013] EWCA Crim 823; 
[2013]  2 Cr. App. R. 29. 
35 See, for instance: G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 2nd edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1983) p.179; Law Commission, Criminal law, A criminal code for England and Wales (HMSO 
1989), Law Com. No. 177, Vol.1 Draft Criminal Law Bill cl 75; Law Commission, Legislating 
the criminal codes: Offences against the person and general principles (HMSO 1993), Law Com. No. 
218, Cm.2370, Appendix A, Draft Criminal Law Bill, Cl. 6. 
36 Unfortunately this approach can be seen in the work of the Law Commission: Law 
Commission, Draft Criminal Law Bill (HMSO 1989) cl 75; Law Commission Legislating the 
criminal codes: Offences against the person and general principles (HMSO 1993), Law Com. No. 
218, Cm.2370, Appendix A, draft Criminal Law Bill, para. 18.7 and Cl. 6; Law Commission,  
Reform of Offences against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper  (HMSO 2014), Law Com. 
Consultation Paper No. 217,   para. 2.13. Law Commission, Reform of offences against the person 
(HMSO 2015), Law Com. No. 361, HC Paper No.555, is silent about the ‘booby trap’ 
situations. 
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always existed to address. If D brings about the contact between V and 
something else, that is sufficient; there is no logical reason for drawing the 
boundary of battery so as to protect the pit-digging, acid-pouring or 
command-giving D. It follows that D’s injunction to V may amount to an 
assault. 
 
Expressly in Beal, Fairclough and Burrows (and implicitly in Rogers) the court 
required an act done by D to V for indecent assault. Once touching is 
understood as bringing V and D (or something else) into mutual contact, it is 
starkly apparent that the Fairclough line is inconsistent with the decisions 
which pre and post date it.  
 
Hostility, consent and unlawfulness 
 
The Fairclough line required not just the act of D moving towards V to make 
contact for an assault, but that such act was ‘hostile’; without hostility the 
conviction in Beal would not have stood, despite actual contact by D moving 
towards V. The absence of hostility in Fairclough, Burrows and Rogers was a 
basis for there being no indecent assault in those cases: “unless there is a 
hostile act, there cannot be an assault”.37 The meaning of hostility, however, 
varies between the cases, sometimes undefined38 but in other cases used to 
                                                 
37 Burrows (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 180 CCA, 182. 
38 Burrows (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 180 CCA and Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 4 CCA. 
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denote a threat39 or an act done against V’s will.40 Hostility is a curious 
requirement as indecent assaults may as easily involve extremely affectionate 
behaviour (in D’s view) as threats or violence. There is no justification in the 
pre-1950s case law on indecent assault for hostility as an element of the 
offence. Despite some later indecent assault cases following the Fairclough 
line,41 the Court of Appeal in Sutton42 limited the requirement of hostility to 
those cases which involved touching which was not in itself indecent and 
then in 1981 Lord Lane CJ provided a clear and unequivocal view in Faulkner 
v Talbot,43  
 
“[a]n assault is any intentional touching of another person without the 
consent of that person and without lawful excuse. It need not 
necessarily be hostile or rude or aggressive, as some of the cases seem 
to indicate.”44  
 
The Court of Appeal in Thomas45 and the House of Lords in Court46 approved 
Lord Lane’s formulation. This current conclusion as to the non-role of 
hostility in indecent assault is at odds with the Fairclough line. There are also 
                                                 
39 Rogers (1953) 37 Cr. App. R. 137 DC. In Fairclough itself there is no mention of hostility, but 
the judgment refers to the need for a threat of violence and as discussed in n.13 above, the 
case has been taken to be authority for the requirement of hostility. 
40 Beal (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 128 DC. 
41 For example Mason (1969) 53 Cr. App. R. 12 (first instance, Veale J), Upward 7 October 7, 
1976 (unreported) (first instance, Wien J). 
42 Sutton (1977) 66 Cr. App. R. 21 CA.  
43 See Faulkner v Talbot (1981) Cr. App. R. 1 DC. 
44 See Faulkner v Talbot (1981) Cr. App. R. 1 DC, 7 (Lord Lane CJ). 
45 Thomas (1985) 81 Cr. App. R. 331 CA (Crim Div), 334.  
46 Court [1989] A.C. 28 HL, 41-42 (Lord Ackner). 
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common assault decisions which refer to hostility as an element of the offence 
right into the current century. There is clearly inconsistency, but which is the 
preferable approach? The case law on common assault uses ‘hostility’ in three 
specific ways, and it is submitted that none of them add a separate 
requirement to common assault and none of them justify finding that the 
paradigm situation must involve hostility to amount to an indecent assault. 
 
First, there is the use of hostility as a signifier of unlawfulness (for example, 
“the least touching of another in anger is a battery”47) but there is no 
concomitant finding that there could not be a common assault in the absence 
of such anger or ill will (for example in Rosinski48 where a doctor’s lies about 
his medical intentions turned an examination into a common assault with no 
need for anger or ill will, and Coney49 where Hawkins J differentiates between 
a “hostile fight begun and continued in anger” and a prize fight but finds 
both to be batteries).  
 
Second, there is hostility as a descriptor, used for conduct with is done 
without V’s consent.50 This adds nothing to the definition of common assault 
(which is already understood as requiring an absence of consent) but it is 
potentially misleading in the paradigm situation as a child (under 16) cannot 
                                                 
47 Cole v Turner (1704) 87 Eng Rep 907, 6 Mod 149, Court of King’s Bench. See also Coney 
(1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534 CCR, 539 (Cave J) and 553 (Hawkins J). 
48 Rosinski (1824) 168 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1 Mood. 26 CCR. 
49 Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534, 553 CCR. 
50 Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 HL, at 280 (Lord Slynn). 
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give legally-recognised consent to an indecent assault.51 The mistake made by 
Lord Goddard in Fairclough of requiring the establishment of an assault (with 
its absence of consent) before considering indecent assault52 is brought into 
sharp focus here. Lord Goddard’s approach was misconceived as there is no 
question of fact related to consent – beyond the child’s age – involved in 
indecent assault of a child, as Lord Lane CJ in Faulkner recognised (“touching 
to which the boy could not in law consent and therefore did not consent”53): 
once there is indecency, consent is irrelevant. 
 
Lord Goddard’s reliance in Beal on the need for D’s act to be against V’s will54 
is also flawed. It is submitted that Beal was not a considered attempt by the 
then Lord Chief Justice to consider will and consent separately, but evidence 
of a desire to circumvent the statutory prohibition on legal recognition of a 
child’s consent. The argument for separation of will and consent might be 
made by those seeking to uphold the Fairclough line, however, so the 
argument should be met; rape was after all originally described as being 
against the woman’s will rather than without her consent.55 It was, however, 
resolved in the nineteenth century that rape was properly understood to be an 
act against V’s consent rather than against her will56 and there is no reason to 
                                                 
51 SOA 1956 ss.14(2) and 15(2). Prior to that the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1922 s.1 
(which was the relevant provision at the time of the Fairclough cases). 
52 See Fairclough at p.140. 
53 Faulkner v Talbot (1981) 74 Cr. App. R. 1 DC, 7-8 (Lord Lane CJ).  
54 Beal v Kelley (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 128 DC, 129. 
55 See Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (first published 1736) Vol. 1, 628 and Coke, Institutes of 
the Lawes of England (first published 1628-1644) Vol. 3, 60.  
56 Camplin (1845) 169 Eng. Rep. 163, 1 Den. 89 and Fletcher (1859) 169 Eng. Rep. 1168, Bell C.C. 
63. 
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think that indecent assault should be treated differently to rape in this regard. 
To conclude otherwise would not only be illogical but require the assumption 
that Parliament, in repeatedly barring defence reliance on a child’s consent,57 
was still leaving the door open to consideration of the child’s will. If will and 
consent were considered separately for children this would create a difference 
between child and adult sexual offences, as there is no suggestion of revisiting 
the role of will in adult offences. There is no justification for, or merit in, 
finding that an indecent assault must be against V’s will as well as done 
without his/her consent.  
 
In Rogers,  Lord Goddard required not just that the act was against the child’s 
will but also that that this unwillingness was demonstrated.58 This is in direct 
opposition to acceptance from the nineteenth century onwards that 
submission can be unwilling and thus does not necessarily exonerate the 
defendant, although it may be evidentially relevant in determining whether 
there was consent.59 Lord Goddard’s reliance upon submission as preventing 
the offence from being made out here cannot be supported; the proper 
conclusion is that where V is a child his/her ostensible consent, demonstrated 
or otherwise, to an indecent assault is irrelevant and can have no proper part 
                                                 
57 The first such statutory bar is found in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1880 s.2 (under 
13’s) repeated in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1922 s.1 (extended to under 16’s) and 
finally repeated in SOA 1956 ss.14(2) and 15(2). 
58 DPP v Rogers (1953) 37 Cr. App. R. 137 DC, 140. 
59 Day (1841) 173 Eng. Rep. 1026, 9 C. & P. 722, Camplin (1845) 169 Eng. Rep. 163, 1 Den. 89 
and R v Nichol (1807) 168 Eng Rep 720, Russ & Ry 130. 
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of the reasoning in determining whether or not D’s conduct constitutes the 
offence, as the later cases of McCormack60 and Faulkner61 held. 
 
The third use of “hostility” in the case law is as a descriptor, denoting conduct 
which is outside the generally acceptable standards of modern society (“every 
laying on of hands is not a battery; for the party's intention must be 
considered: for people will sometimes by way of joke, or in friendship, clap a 
man on the back” 62). This use of the term was adopted by Lord Goff in his 
analysis of hostility in Collins v Wilcock63 and F v West Berkshire Health 
Authority64 using the term for “a general exception embracing all physical 
contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life” 
which prevented such conduct from constituting common assault. 65 (This is 
perhaps better understood as an exception for conduct within “generally 
acceptable standards” whether or not the conduct is an everyday occurrence 
and this will be term used for this exception in this article.66) This exception 
goes beyond consent, express or implied, as it applies to those, like children, 
                                                 
60 McCormack [1969] 2 Q.B. 442 CA (Crim Div). A similar decision was reached in Kallides 
unreported 11 November 1976 CA (Crim Div) referred to in Sutton (1977) 66 Cr. App. R. 21 
CA (Crim Div). 
61 Faulkner v Talbot (1981) 74 Cr. App. R. 1 DC. 
62 Williams v Jones (1736) Cas T Hard 299, 301, 95 Eng Rep 193, Court of Common Please, 194 
(Lord Hardwicke CJ). See more recently B(MA) [2013] EWCA Crim 3; [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. 36 
CA (Crim Div) and Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 HL, at 244 (Lord Jauncey). 
63 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All E.R. 374 DC. 
64 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 A.C. 1 HL.  
65 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All E.R. 374 DC, 378. 
66 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 A.C. 1 HL, 16 and 17. 
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who cannot lawfully give their consent,67 as long as the context of D’s conduct 
genuinely comes within generally acceptable standards.  
 
It is obviously correct that not all contact between D and V in circumstances 
of indecency will necessarily be an indecent assault. Fear of making the 
offence too wide led to the Fairclough line’s requirement of hostility both in 
the paradigm situation (as in Rogers with Lord Goddard obviously keen not to 
criminalise fathers who put their arms round their daughters) and outside it 
(as in Williams v Gibbs68 where D was acquitted of indecent assaults 
committed when drying children after swimming, apparently on the basis of 
Rogers). Although Williams was a strange decision even at the time, the case of 
Sutton69 shows the problem with using hostility to avoid feared over-
criminalisation. In that case D took pornographic photographs of naked 
young boys but was acquitted of indecent assault as he only touched the boys 
to show them how to pose. Sutton involves a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the exception, caused perhaps by using the label “hostile” to denote 
conduct not covered by it. Once the label is put aside and the focus turned to 
considering whether the exception for conduct within generally acceptable 
standards really applies in the situation in Sutton, the analysis is 
straightforward. This can be seen using the example of D washing a child in 
the bath. This conduct is capable of coming within the exception for generally 
accepted conduct. Obviously, this exception is not based upon the child’s 
                                                 
67 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1, HL, 72 (Lord Goff). 
68 Williams v Gibbs [1958] Crim. L.R. 127 DC (Lord Goddard CJ, Devlin and Pearson JJ). 
69 Sutton (1977) 66 Cr. App. R. 21 CA.  
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consent (even a child being washed against his or her will is generally not the 
victim of an assault, common or indecent), but it will depend on context (D 
using washing a child in the bath as an excuse to rub the child’s genitals for 
sexual gratification would not fall within generally acceptable standards and 
thus would be an offence whereas D just washing the child would).70 In 
Sutton the contact is capable of coming within the exception – moving the 
children to indicate poses – but the context of that contact – the children being 
naked and the movement being to enable indecent photographs to be taken 
for pornographic use – means that it cannot possibly in fact be encompassed 
by the exception. 
 
It is submitted that any reference to hostility in indecent, or common, assault 
is misplaced as the plethora of definitions lead to a lack of consistency and 
clarity in the law.71 None of the definitions add a new and necessary element 
to assault and they are particularly inapposite in the paradigm situation. 
Importantly for a criminal law term, no non-lawyer could be expected to 
make sense of it, and even lawyers and judges appear to be misled by its 
many and varied meanings. It is best set aside together with any idea that the 
child’s will or consent is relevant to indecent assault. The exception for 
conduct within generally acceptable standards can thus be applied without 
any taint of “hostility”. 
                                                 
70 See Court [1989] 1 A.C. 28 HL. 
71 The authors of Smith & Hogan have not, since the start of that textbook’s existence, been in 
favour of the hostility requirement in common or indecent assault and have been consistently 
critical of Brown and now also R v B(MA) in this respect. See most recently D. Ormerod and K. 
Laird, Smith & Hogan’s  Criminal Law 14th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2015) p.708-9. 
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Indecent assault in the paradigm cases 
 
The Fairclough line is at best permeated by a set of legal errors and 
misunderstandings and at worst manifestations of the belief that children 
should resist the indecent attentions of adults, even when they are very 
young, or alone with the adult, or that adult is their father. Whatever the 
reason, the line stands in sharp contrast to the approach in Rolfe and is an 
unsupportable approach. On the basis of the discussion above, a proper 
understanding of indecent assault law in the paradigm case can be 
summarised thus: 
 An instruction to child V to touch adult D’s genitals is in itself an 
indecent assault, if the child apprehends that that contact will take 
place.  
 If V complies with the instruction, that is an indecent assault even 
though V moves towards D.  
 There is no requirement of movement by D towards V (or indeed any 
physical act by D). 
 There is no requirement of any threat, ill will or malevolence on the 
part of D.  
 If D is acting out of affection for V, D’s instruction and V’s compliance 
with it are still capable of constituting offences by D.  
 V’s consent or will in relation to the invitation/conduct is irrelevant.  
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 The exception for generally accepted conduct will save D’s instruction 
if the context means that the command and any compliance with it are 
not in fact indecent (for example, where D is instructing V to rub 
ointment into D’s genitals because he cannot and there is no-one else 
who is present and able to do so).  
   
With the errors of law understood it is possible and, it is submitted, necessary, 
to correct the erroneous Fairclough principles and bring them in line with the 
rest of the cases on indecent and common assault by giving effect to the points 
listed above. 
 
Can and should indecent assault be changed retrospectively? 
When Parliament has intervened, should judges refuse to do so? 
 
The Court of Appeal stated, when endorsing Fairclough in Dunn, that there 
was “nothing to justify our contradicting Parliament’s premise [in enacting 
the IWCA] and overturning what has been settled law since Fairclough”. As 
examined above, the law is not quite settled and the Fairclough principles are 
not correct, but can it be right then not to correct the Fairclough line because of 
Parliament’s intervention? When the marital rape exemption – another 
common law rule applied to what had become a statutory offence72 – fell to be 
                                                 
72 Rape having been a common law offence which fell within the statutory ambit in the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 and was then defined in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. 
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considered by the House of Lords in R v R73, that was certainly the view of 
some of those who criticised their Lordships’ decision to abolish the 
exemption,74 although Parliament’s failure to fully correct the law, was 
suggested as a reason to intervene by Padfield.75 It is submitted that Padfield’s 
approach makes more sense. Parliamentary intervention has no magical 
effect; the nature of any intervention is key as not all interventions are of 
equal type or importance, but must be seen in their practical context.  
 
With indecent assault, in distinction to rape, there has been no statutory 
definition of the offence and the common law rule being applied was really 
the definition of assault which remains (in its definition at least) common law. 
Parliament’s intervention was to create the IWCA following the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee’s (CLRC) First Report, issued in 1959, which advised the 
Home Secretary to seek to legislate so that any person who committed an act 
of gross indecency with or towards a child of under fourteen (or incited such 
a child) would be guilty of an offence. 76 The result was the IWCA offence in 
those terms. Parliament’s reliance on the CLRC report was in itself not wholly 
justified. The CLRC’s report is very brief, just three pages long. Its terms of 
reference were  
 
                                                 
73 R v R [1992] 1 A.C. 599 HL. 
74 Marianne Giles, “Judicial law-making in the criminal courts: the case of marital rape” [1992] 
Crim. L.R. 407; Michael Jefferson, “The Marital Rape Exception” (1991) 55(3) J. Crim. L. 357. 
75 Nicola Padfield, “Judicial law-making” [1992] Crim. L.R. 860 (in response to Giles’ article). 
76 Criminal Law Revision Committee, First Report (Indecency with Children) (HMSO 1959). 
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“to consider ‘what alterations to the criminal law should be made to 
provide for the punishment of a person who, without committing an 
assault, invites a child to handle him indecently or otherwise behaves 
indecently towards a child’”.  
 
It is strange, perhaps due to deference to the Lord Chief Justice and his 
decisions, that it did not consider whether any alterations were in fact 
necessary, whether such an invitation was in fact at an assault, and instead 
simply accepted that there was a gap in the law.77 The cases were not without 
criticism even in the 1950s; the enticingly entitled Criminal Law Review 
article “The Criminal Law and the Woman Seducer” in 1956 had analysed the 
decisions and concluded that they were in error.78 As the CLRC’s report was 
inevitably going to be relied upon by Parliament, it is all the more unfortunate 
that the committee did not take a more questioning approach. Having 
erroneously concluded that there was a gap in the law, the CLRC then failed 
to adequately fill the perceived gap, suggesting only an offence to cover those 
aged 13 or under as children aged 14 and 15 were “sufficiently protected by 
the existing provisions as regards sexual offences” and there was only a need 
“to protect children who are incited to do indecent things the nature of which 
they do not fully understand“,79 not to protect children generally from sexual 
abuse; ‘knowing’ children did not merit protection. As a result the IWCA 
                                                 
77 Criminal Law Revision Committee First Report (Indecency with Children) (HMSO 1959), [3]. 
78 A. N. Mackesey, “The Criminal Law and the Woman Seducer” [1956] Crim. L.R. 456 and 
529, although the criticism relies on ‘passive’ battery which ignores the role of D’s instruction 
to V and is thus easier to refute. 
79 Criminal Law Revision Committee First Report (Indecency with Children) (HMSO 1959), [9]. 
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offence only covered children aged under 14 (an age limit which was only 
raised to 16 in 200180). Parliament’s intervention was thus based on errors and 
outdated views of child protection which were contrary to Parliament’s own 
previously expressed views (in 1880, 1921 and 1956) that children aged under 
16 could not legally consent to indecent behaviour not a particularly good 
reason not to correct the errors in the Fairclough cases. 
 
The effect Parliament’s intervention in the form of the IWCA offence and the 
Fairclough principles, is that D will escape liability where: (1) D is convicted of 
indecent assault and the Court of Appeal allows an appeal on the basis of 
Fairclough (as in Dunn); or (2) or where the conduct took place prior to 2001 
and the child was aged 14 or 1581. Even where the IWCA offence does apply, 
for conduct prior to 1997 it generally provides a significantly lower maximum 
sentence than does indecent assault.82 For juries the IWCA offence provides 
unnecessary and complicating extra law when such conduct could be covered 
by the more straightforward offence indecent assault. Parliament’s 
                                                 
80 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 s.39. 
81 A case involving this situation formed the basis of a query from a practitioner colleague in 
2015 which led to this paper being written. Mistakes are often made at first instance because 
of the anomalous situation of 14 and 15 year olds not being covered by the IWCA offence, see 
for example R v O(D) [2014] EWCA Crim 2202; [2015] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 41 where an IWCA 
conviction was quashed as V might have been 14 when the conduct occurred.  
82 The maximum sentence for the IWCA offence was two years until 1997 when it was 
increased to ten years (by the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 s.52), in line with indecent assault. 
Indecent assault has carried the ten year maximum sentence for boys since 1957 and for girls 
since 1985 (amendment under the Sexual Offences Act 1985 s.3(3)) (see SOA 1956 s.37 and 
Sch.2, paras.17 and 18). Before 1985 indecent assault on a girl aged under 13 carried a 
maximum sentence of five years (although the maximum sentence for indecent assault on a 
girl aged 14 or 15 was two years). 
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intervention is no reason not to correct the Fairclough errors; indeed 
Parliament has compounded the errors rather than correcting them. 
 
Should judges intervene at all? 
 
There are those who would argue that as a matter of principle, the courts 
should not engage in judicial law-making, irrespective of any prior 
Parliamentary intervention.83 Judicial law-making is a broad category of 
activity, however and it is submitted that it is sometimes part of the 
responsibility of the judiciary to make law. Creating or abolishing offences is 
unacceptable to not just some academics but now also the courts.84 At the 
opposite end of the scale is the situation where a court must interpret words 
within a statute or apply the law to a novel situation. In so doing the judiciary 
must be careful to apply principle rather than just their own moral view,85 but 
it is submitted that to avoid making any decision in such cases would be an 
abdication of judicial responsibility. R v R could be seen as adding to the 
category of acceptable judicial law-making the need to respond to a social 
changes, but this runs the obvious risk of being led by judicial moral 
                                                 
83 A.T.H. Smith, “Judicial Law Making in the Criminal Law (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 46, Andrew 
Ashworth, “Interpreting criminal statutes: a crisis of legality?” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 419, 
Marianne Giles, “Judicial law-making in the criminal courts: the case of marital rape” [1992] 
Crim. L.R. 407, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “How far should judges develop the common 
law?” [2014] C.J.I.C.L. 124, Alan Patterson, “Decision-making in the UK’s top court” [2014] 
C.J.I.C.L. 77. 
84 Knuller v DPP [1973] A.C. 435 HL and Jones et al [2006] UKHL 16; [2007] 1 A.C. 136 [60]-[62]. 
85 Marianne Giles’s reply to Nicola Padfield’s response to her criticism of R v R [1992] Crim. 
L.R. 680, A.T.H. Smith, “Judicial Law Making in the Criminal Law (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 46, 149 
and Andrew Ashworth, “Interpreting criminal statutes: a crisis of legality?” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 
419, 445-448. 
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assumptions rather than principle. There are interlinked arguments against 
seeing R v R in such simple terms, though. Women’s rights are fundamental 
human rights and not the subject of societal whim or change, although the 
tendency of some to recognise those rights may max and wane as society 
changes. Women have not suddenly become considered the equal of men as 
part of fashion, men and women are equal. To hold otherwise is not merely 
unacceptable in light of some changeable modern standard, it is simply and 
fundamentally wrong. The fact that courts had repeatedly presumed that the 
exemption existed as women could not withdraw their consent whilst 
married did not mean that they were right; the Emperor did not suddenly 
become clothed because enough people, however erudite, thought he was. As 
Lord Judge CJ details in R v C (applying R v R to conduct in the 1970s) it is a 
gross oversimplification to say that women were once the chattels of their 
husbands and “Hale’s unqualified statement that a wife could not retract her 
consent to sexual intercourse was [legally] wrong”.86 R v R should thus not be 
seen as an example of changing the law on the basis of societal changes but an 
example of correcting a law which is simply wrong, an approach which has 
been accepted since at least the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)87 and 
which recently received the ringing endorsement of the Supreme Court in 
Jogee: 
 
                                                 
86 R v C [2004] EWCA Crim 292; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2098 [10] – [17]. 
87 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234; (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 191 HL (and 
applicable to the Supreme Court). 
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“As to the argument that even if the court is satisfied that the law took 
a wrong turn, any correction should now be left to Parliament, the 
doctrine of secondary liability is a common law doctrine (put into 
statutory form in section 8 of the 1861 Act) and, if it has been unduly 
widened by the courts, it is proper for the courts to correct the error.”88  
 
This is closely analogous to the Fairclough situation. For the judiciary to fail to 
correct errors made by the judiciary is an abdication of judicial responsibility. 
Were a case like Dunn to come before the Court of Appeal again, it is 
submitted that the conviction of D for indecent assault in the paradigm 
situation should be upheld on the basis that the decision in Fairclough and the 
allied cases were wrong in law.  
 
Should any change be retroactive? 
 
The final issue to be considered is how such a decision of the Court of Appeal 
could and should take effect. Due to the repeal of the offence of indecent 
assault in 200489, such a decision would, by the normal operation of the 
common law, affect the conduct in that particular case, and all other conduct 
which might amount to an indecent assault, all of which would have taken 
                                                 
88 Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [85]. The case does not stand alone, for example R v Howe [1987] 1 A.C. 
417 (HL). See discussion in Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (London: Hart 
Publishing 2008) pp.191-192. 
89 When ss. 14 and 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was repealed by the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003, sch 7 (Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Commencement) Order 2004, SI 2004/874, art 2). 
 29 
place in the past.90 This has often been understood as the declaratory theory; 
the idea that the court would be stating what the law is and what it has 
always been rather than changing it.91 The theory is subject to academic 
criticism, although some support it, if only to limit the powers of the 
judiciary92. It is submitted that the declaratory theory, a legal fiction perhaps 
necessary when the common law rather than statute was the source of the 
majority of criminal law, is no longer necessary to explain the effect of judicial 
decisions; better to face the truth that judges do sometimes make law and that 
law is applied retrospectively than hide behind a fiction. 
 
It has already been accepted by the House of Lords, Supreme Court and Privy 
Council that the declaratory theory is a fiction, that judges do, within limits, 
change the law and such decisions might or might not have retrospective 
effect,93 although there is a presumption that decisions will take effect 
retrospectively94. Putting aside the declaratory theory does not mean that 
                                                 
90 Common assault would also be affected by such a decision, but that would be in relation to 
both past and future conduct, so the concentration in this article is on indecent assault to deal 
squarely with the issue of retroactivity. 
91 A classic explanation is seen in Willis & Co. v Baddeley [1892] 2 QB 324 CA, 326:  “There is, in 
fact, no such thing as judge-made law, for the judges do not make the law, though they 
frequently have to apply existing law to circumstances as to which it has not previously been 
authoritatively laid down that such law is applicable”.  
92 For an example of criticism see Peter Mirfield, “A challenge to the declaratory theory of 
law” (2008) 124 L.Q.R. 190. For a defence of the theory see Allan Beever, “The Declaratory 
Theory of Law” (2013) 33(3) O.J.L.S. 421. 
93 Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C. 1 (HL), Miller v Dickson [2001] UKPC 
D4; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1615 [35], In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 2 
A.C. 680, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 49; 
[2007] 1 A.C. 558 [23], International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich International plc [2015] UKSC 33; 
[2015] 2 W.L.R. 1471 [53], Ramdeen v Trinidad and Tobago [2014] UKPC 7; [2015] A.C. 562 [90] 
(per Lord Mance and Lord Sumption) and Hunte v Trinidad and Tobago [2015] UKPC 33 [76]. 
See also Tom Bingham in The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2010) .  
94 Ferguson v Trinidad and Tobago [2016] UKPC 2 [24]. 
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judicial decisions cannot have retrospective effect, it is to admit that that 
retrospective effect is a retroactive changing of the law rather than a statement 
of what the law in fact was at the time.95 That retroactive change may be 
justified, or sometimes, not. The decision as to whether a particular decision 
should be of retroactive effect is one which needs to be reached as a result of a 
balancing exercise, weighing the important but competing principles at play. 
It is submitted that in the Fairclough situation that balancing exercise should 
come down in favour of retroactive effect, but to explain this the principles 
involved must be considered. 
 
The Rule of Law and art.7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) both provide strong arguments against criminal legal changes having 
retrospective effect. The Rule of Law has been tackled by some of the most 
eminent legal thinkers, but remains a concept easier to cite than to 
comprehensively define.96 This is not the place for a full discussion of the Rule 
of Law, but it is submitted that the core of the Rule of Law is sufficiently clear. 
The principle of non-retrospectivity is not fundamental to the Rule of Law but 
is instead an effect of the central tenets of accessibility, ascertainability and 
certainty: it is generally difficult to argue that a law with retrospective effect is 
                                                 
95 “Retrospective” referring to all ways in which current changes apply to the past and 
“retroactive” meaning only where the law of the past is declared to be changed: see the 
helpful discussions of these terms in Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law 
(London: Hart Publishing 2008) ch. 1, especially pp.6-9. 
96 See for instance A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 8th edn 
(London: Macmillan, 1915),  Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 2nd revised edn (New Haven; Yale 
University Press, 1969), Joseph Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law, 
2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and Tom Bingham in The Rule of Law (London: Allen 
Lane, 2010). 
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accessible or ascertainable at the time of D’s conduct, when that conduct 
occurred before the law comes into being, and this undermines certainty. This 
is not to say that a legal decision should not ever be of retrospective effect, or, 
more specifically, be retroactive. None of these principles require that there is 
any more than a presumption against retrospectivity as there may be 
situations where other factors and principles come into play. Hart’s view was 
that the presumption did not even apply in relation to “hard cases… which 
the law has left incompletely regulated”.97 The House of Lords, and now the 
Supreme Court, recognised in the Practice Statement that whilst certainty is 
important in criminal law, it might nevertheless be right to depart from 
previous decisions retroactively.98 If there is only a presumption against 
retrospectivity, this begs the question of what might rebut that presumption. 
In this respect the human rights framework and approach assists. 
 
Although art.7(1) of the ECHR is in stark terms: 
 
“No-one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed.” 
 
                                                 
97 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p.276 (in postscript 
response to Dworkin). 
98 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234; (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 191 HL (and 
applicable to the Supreme Court). 
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its application is more nuanced, allowing for “an inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation… elucidation of doubtful points and… adaptation to changing 
circumstances” and taking into account that in the UK “progressive 
development of the criminal law through judicial law making is a well-
entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition.”99 This is in accordance with 
the principles considered above. 
 
Art. 7(1) ECHR is also subject to art. 7(2):  
 
“This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations”.  
 
This has been found by UK courts to justify looking at D’s conduct and 
determining whether a reasonable person in a civilised country would 
consider it unlawful.100 However, the travaux préparatoires for the ECHR 
indicate that art.7(2) was inserted at the request of the UK government to 
avoid any suggestion that the ECHR impugned the validity of the judgments 
                                                 
99 S.W. v U.K. (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 363 [36]. See also Kononov v Latvia (2010) 52 E.H.R.R.21 [185] 
and Maktouf v Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 11 [72]. 
100 R v C [2004] EWCA Crim 292; [2004] W.L.R. 2098 [24] per Lord Judge CJ and Dyer v Watson 
[2002] UKPC D1; [2004] 1 A.C. 379 PC (Scotland) [49] per Lord Bingham. 
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of the Nuremberg Tribunals101 and the European Court has occasionally 
noted this in the context of war crimes cases before it.102 That is not to say that 
the UK courts’ interpretation of art.7(2) is wrong. It is strongly arguable that 
the UK courts’ interpretation is preferable. Intentionalism is only one tool of 
interpretation103 and where it is used it must be used carefully, with 
consideration for the context and limits of the travaux préparatoires. The 
ECHR was intended to recognise and guarantee minimum rather than 
aspirational standards.104 If the Nuremberg Tribunals were not unlawful that 
would be due to underlying principle, rather than art.7(2) itself having 
retrospective effect105 and the UK decisions do no more than recognise that 
underlying principle. The conduct would have to be of a particularly heinous 
kind to come within this underlying principle, however, to avoid the charge 
that a court was simply turning its own morality into law. For example, Lord 
Judge CJ may well have been overstepping the mark when in 2004 he asserted 
that the marital rape exemption did not apply in any civilised country,106 as, 
                                                 
101 Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention, document number DH(57)6 p.4 available online 
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TravPrep_Table_ENG.pdf [Accessed 14 
April 2016]. 
102 Kononov v Latvia (2010) 52 E.H.R.R.21 [185] – [186] and Maktouf v Bosnia (2014) 58 
E.H.R.R.11 [72] – [73]. 
103 In relation to international treaties, see art.32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 
104 As noted in Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC D1; [2004] 1 A.C. 379 PC (Scotland) [48] and [49] 
per Lord Bingham. 
105 It was clearly the intention of those drafting the ECHR that it should be of prospective 
effect only, see Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention, document number CDH(70)10 p.8 
available online at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TravPrep_Table_ENG.pdf 
[Accessed 14 April 2016]. 
106 R v C [2004] EWCA Crim 292; [2004] W.L.R. 2098 [24]. 
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for instance, Turkey and South Korea (to name but two states) had not at that 
stage criminalised marital rape.107  
 
That is not to say that the heinous nature of the conduct is irrelevant. It is 
submitted that it is part of the balancing exercise a court must perform when 
determining whether a particular instance of retrospective law-making is 
justified. V’s right not to be subjected to heinous conduct, and to expect the 
state to deal with such conduct appropriately, may weigh heavily against D’s 
right not to be retroactively criminalised. It was recognised by the European 
Court of Human Rights in MC v Bulgaria108 that the state’s positive obligation 
under art. 8 extends to “penalisation and effective prosecution of any non-
consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the 
victim”.109 The court noted that “[c]hildren and other vulnerable individuals, 
in particular, are entitled to effective protection”.110 By failing to correct 
erroneous case law and enable prosecution for the appropriate, and more 
serious, offence of indecent assault, it can be argued that the state is failing in 
its positive obligations under art. 8 to protect the child Vs.111 It is submitted 
                                                 
107 Both states now do criminalise marital rape. In relation to Turkey see United Nations Press 
Release, “Anti-Discrimination Committee takes up Situation of Women in Turkey” 21 
January 2005 online at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/wom1480.html 
[Accessed 5 May 2016] and in relation to South Korea see Yonhap News Agency, “Top court 
recognises marital rape as crime for the first time” online at 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/05/16/3/0302000000AEN201305160031003
15F.HTML [Accessed 5 May 2016]. 
108 MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 20 European Court of Human Rights 
109 Ibid [166]. 
110 Ibid [150]. 
111 See a similar argument raised against the decision in R v J [2004] UKHL 42; [2005] 1 A.C. 
562 in Jonathan Rogers, “Fundamentally objectionable” (2007) 157 N.L.J. 1252 although there 
the argument is put in terms of deterrence which is ultimately unsuccessful as all conduct to 
which the case applied was in the past. 
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that just as a conviction passed upon D under mistaken old law must be 
corrected when it comes before the courts112 so a mistaken aspect of the law 
which leads to injustice for V must be corrected when V’s allegation is tried.113  
 
The determination as to whether retroactive change is justified has also been 
suggested to depend upon whether the change could have been foreseen with 
appropriate legal advice.114 This is a hypothetical approach and as such 
should be viewed with some suspicion. It relies on the presumption against 
retrospectivity being based on actual reliance by D on the current state of the 
law, but D will rarely have consulted a lawyer before embarking on his/her 
conduct. When the presumption is understood as a part of the Rule of Law 
requirement of ascertainability it is more properly seen as being based on D’s 
right to rely on the law being capable of ascertainment at the time of his/her 
conduct.115 But an ascertainable law is not necessarily one that is correct or 
justified. It is submitted that where the law is wrong, it does not matter 
whether a hypothetical lawyer if hypothetically consulted would have 
spotted this error. There is a duty on the courts to correct their errors and this 
must be weighed against the right of D to have ascertainable law. 
 
                                                 
112 As in the case of Caley-Knowles [2006] EWCA Crim Div 1611; [2007] 1 Cr.App.R. 13. The 
appellate courts are, however, keen to prevent such cases coming before them, as most 
recently expressed by the Supreme Court in Jogee. 
113 A point made forcefully by Baroness Hale in her dissenting speech in R v J [2004] UKHL 
42; [2005] 1 A.C. 562.  
114 S.W. v U.K. (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 363 [48] and R v C [2004] EWCA Crim 292; [2004] W.L.R. 
2098 [18] – [21]. 
115 See the helpful discussion in Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (London: 
Hart Publishing 2008) ch. 3. 
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Continuing to apply the Fairclough line to past indecent assault cases does in 
fact not achieve the Rule of Law aim of certainty in the criminal law. The 
indecent assault cases of McCormack, Faulkner, Thomas and Court are 
inconsistent with the Fairclough line. The Fairclough line is not even applied 
consistently at first instance. For example, ex-headmistress Anne Lakey’s 2015 
convictions for indecent assaults in the 1980s appear to have been based 
purely upon her having sexual intercourse with two boys aged under 16 
rather than any extraneous activity on her part.116 In Dunn itself D was 
originally prosecuted for and convicted of indecent assault for instructing V 
to masturbate him. If reports of sentencing appeals are examined, a number of 
cases can be found where there are convictions upon indecent assault counts 
which involve the paradigm situation, where V has complied with D’s 
invitation or injunction to masturbate or perform oral sex on him.117 Leaving 
Fairclough alone perpetuates inconsistency as well as inaccuracy and injustice. 
 
Such a retroactive decision would not be a first in relation to prosecutions 
under the repealed SOA 1956. In R v J in 2004 the House of Lords showed 
itself willing to change the law relating to indecent assault in favour of D 
concluding that charging indecent assault to avoid the time bar on unlawful 
sexual intercourse (which had until the House of Lords’ ruling been a 
                                                 
116 The Telegraph “Headteacher was ‘sexual predator’ who exploited her situation” (9 June 
2015) telegraph.co.uk, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11661679/Headteacher-was-sexual-predator-who-exploited-her-situation.html [Accessed 7 
December 2015]. 
117 Clifford [2014] EWCA Crim Div 2245; [2015] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 32 (in relation to counts 3, 5 
and 6), Zaid S [2005] EWCA Crim 733 and Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 39 of 2003) Michael 
Wheeler [2003] EWCA Crim 3068; [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 79. 
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common prosecution approach) was an abuse of process, despite all conduct 
thus affected having already taken place.118 To then refuse to make a change 
which properly protects Vs is unjustified and would, again, constitute an 
abdication of judicial responsibility. 
 
Following this examination of the competing rights, interests and principles at 
play in the balancing exercise to determine whether the law should be 
changed retroactively, against such change stand the needs for 
ascertainability, accessibility and certainty in the law giving rise to a 
rebuttable presumption against retroactive change. In favour of this change 
stand V’s right to protection of his/her art.8 rights from D’s actions by the 
state prosecuting D’s breaches of V’s rights and the heinous nature of D’s 
conduct. Looking at the system more broadly, against the Rule of Law 
principles mentioned must be weighed the importance of the law being not 
just certain but also right, the need for consistency across the law rather than 
conflicting lines of authority and the duty these needs place upon the courts 
to correct judicially-created errors. 
 
The Fairclough line of authority might be equated to a form of ‘zombie law’ – 
dead but still walking about and causing trouble. Killing it off would be a 
very specific, and it is submitted beneficial, type of judicial law-making. 
 
                                                 
118 R v J [2004] UKHL 42; [2005] 1 AC 562. 
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